International policy coordination has been the fastest-growing research topic in the field of open-economy macroeconomics.1 The topic owes its success to the happy marriage of the mathematical techniques of game theory and the practical problem of coordination that has in the mid-1980s become of central concern to international policy-makers.
Virtually all of the coordination literature has made the automatic assumption that policy-makers agree on the true model of how the world macroeconomy behaves. As a consequence, it has reached a very strong conclusion: in general, countries will be better off it they coordinate policies than they would be in the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium in which each government sets its policies while taking those of the others as given.2 The empirical literature is as yet less fully developed than the theoretical literature. But it too has claimed gains from coordination that, though small, are necessarily positive.3 If the case in favor of coordination is indeed this clear, one might wonder at the stupidity of governments in not pursuing it more seriously.
The assumption that policy-makers agree on the true model has little, if any, empirical basis. Different governments subscribe to different economic philosophies. If one wishes to think of actors as perpetually processing new information in a Bayesian manner, so that their models over time would converge on any given reality in the limit, then one must admit that the speed of convergence is sufficiently slow, or else that reality is changing sufficiently rapidly, that policy-makers have not been able to reach agreement on the true model.
Nor is there much prospect of them doing so in the foreseeable future.
Professional economists are not much more able to agree on the correct macroeconomic model than are policy-makers. A concrete illustration was offered by a recent exercise at the Brookings Institution. Ralph Bryant and Dale Henderson asked those responsible for twelve leading econometric models of the world economy to simulate the effects of some carefully-specified policy changes.k The predictions of the models varied widely as to both the magnitude and the sign of the effects on output, inflation, exchange rates and current account balances among trading partners and even in the country originating the policy change. (See tables 1 and 6 below.) Obviously no more than one of the models can be right, and it seems unlikely that even one of them is in fact exactly right.
Lack of knowledge as to the true model helps explain a troublesome fact. While support for the proposition that coordination would improve welfare is widespread, proponents do not generally agree on the nature of the Pareto-improving package of policy changes that is called for in any particular set of circumstances. Some call for coordinated expansion, some for coordinated discipline, some for coordinated shifts in the mix between monetary and fiscal policy, and so forth.5 Obviously if one sort of package would raise welfare, then others would lower welfare. Disagreement, even within one country, as to where the economy currently sits relative to the desired values of the target variables is responsible f or some of the disagreement on the desirable coordinated policy changes, but disagreement as to the correct model is also a significant factor. As Branson (1986, 176) says, "With this range of disagreement on economic analysis, how are the negotiators -3-to reach agreement? The topic is one for the National Science Foundation, not a new Bretton Woods."
One implication of the lack of agreement on the true model is, of course, that "more research needs to be done." But the implications for any policy coordination that might take place in the meantime are considerably more interesting. This paper demonstrates two propositions that hold when policy-makers disagree on the model. First, in contrast to what one might think before careful reflection, such policy-makers will in general be able to find a package of coordinated policy changes that each believes will improve its country's welfare relative to the sub-optimal Nash noncooperative equilibrium.6 Second, and in striking contrast to the standard result when policy-makers agree on the model, the package of coordinated policy changes could turn out to reduce welfare, as judged by some true model of reality, as easily as raise it.
For example, using eight models from the Brookings simulations as models which could represent the views of the U.S. government, the views of other industrialized countries, or the true world macroeconomy, we find that out of 512 possible combinations, monetary coordination perceptibly improves U.S. welfare in only 289 cases, reducing it in 206 cases, and improves the welfare of the other industrialized countries in only 297 cases, reducing it in 198.
The first two sections of the paper analyze a very simple game where two countries, the United States and Europe, must decide how to set their money supplies so as to come as close as possible to their desired levels of two target variables: income and the current account (internal balance and external balance). Section 1 makes the two points theoretically, that the two central banks will in general be able to agree on a coordinated policy package that each thinks leaves its country in a better position, and that the package might in fact leave them in a worse position. Section 2 uses the multipliers from the eight models in the Brookings simulations to provide a dramatic illustrationof the points.
In section 3 each government is given a second policy instrument, government expenditure, to use, in addition to monetary policy, and a third target variable, inflation, to pursue in addition to income and the current account. Again we see that the governments will in general find a coordinated policy package that they expect to improve welfare, but that it could as easily have the opposite effect in reality. Section $ considers extensions of the framework to deal with the policy-maker's uncertainty regarding the true model, or the other player's model, or both. Here we assume that each country is interested in two target variables: its own output, denoted y for the United States and y for Europe (expressed relative to their optimum values and in log form), and its current account balance, denoted x and x respectively (expressed as a percentage of GNP and again relative to their optimums). Each government seeks to minimize a quadratic loss function.
(1) W = y2+wx2
(2) = y*2 + w x2 where w and u* denote the relative weights placed on external balance versus internal balance.
We assume a general framework in which the targets are linearly related to the available policy instruments, which in this section are limited to the countries' money supplies, m and m* respectively (in log form). We denote the parameters as perceived by the U.S. authorities by a "us" subscript. (3) y=Aus÷Cusm÷Eusm* (14) x=Bus+Dusm+Fusm*
We denote the parameters perceived by the European government by an "e" subscript. (5) y*=Ge+Iem+Kem* (6) x*He+Jem+Lem* Since each country has only a single instrument but two targets, it cannot unilaterally achieve Its targets. We begin by considering the Nash non-000peraclve equilibrium. To ascertain U.S. behavior we differentiate (1) with respect to m, using (3) and ('4) and holding m constant. It follows that the U.S. reaction function Is: To ascertain European behavior we differentiate (2) with respect to rn, using (5) and (6) We solve equations (7) and (8) for the Nash equilibrium. We have drawn the European reaction curve as steeper than the U.S. curve. One might expect that the effects that are largest in absolute value are the positive effects of money on domestic output: C in equations (3) -() for the United States and K in equations (5)- (6) for the non-U.S. OECD.7 It follows that, unless the welfare weight o on the current account is large, the absolute value of the slope of the U.S. reaction function is less than one when the U.S. money supply is on the vertical axis, and vice versa for the European reaction function.
The possibilities for the sign of the slope are more diverse.
If monetary expansion is thought to be transmitted negatively to trading partners (E < 0), presumably via a depreciation of the currency and improvement in the trade balance of the expanding country as in the Mundell-Fleming model, then the slope is positive: N > 0. If monetary transmission is thought to be positive on the other hand CE > 0), then the slope is ambiguous: when the welfare weight w on the current account is small, the slope is negative, but when w is large, or when the transmission multiplier E Is small (relative not only to the own multiplier C, but also to the current account multipliers D and F), the slope is again positive. (We are assuming that D and F, the effects of m and m* on the domestic current account, are of opposite signs by symmetry.)
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The same analysis holds for the foreign reaction function (e.g., I < 0 => R > 0), though it must be remembered that even if any given model is symmetric, the two reaction functions could easily have opposite slopes. For example one country might believe that transmission is negative and the other that it is positive. In figure 1 we have drawn the functions downward-sloping: a foreign expansion is transmitted positively to the domestic country and so the domestic government reacts by contracting.
The Nash equilibrium N is determined as the intersection of the two reaction functions. At N the indifference curves cannot be tangent, but must intersect, since their respective slopes are infinity and zero. It follows that the Nash equilibrium is perceived as Pareto-inefficient. Both policy-makers think they would be better off if they could agree to move to a point within the "lens" determined by the intersection of the two indifference curves.
As we have drawn the graph, each country would like to expand but is afraid to do so on its own, presumably because of adverse implications for the current account. But they can agree to expand simultaneously, moving northeastward in the graph to higher levels of perceived welfare. Such joint reflation is the kind of international coordination that has been urged on Germany and Japan by the United One would differentiate with respect to m and m* to find the bargaining solution (mb, m*b), a point such as B in figure 2.
Once we recognize that the two policy-makers have different models of the world, we must recognize that one, or both, will be wrong.
To evaluate whether the bargaining solution B is superior to the noncooperative solution (m", m*r) not just in perception but also in reality, we would have to know the true parameter values, the output and current account functions (3)-(6) without the subscripts: (12) y =A+Cm+Em* (13)
y=G+Im+Km* (15)
We would then plug mb and m*b into (12)- (15), and in turn plug the target variables Into the loss functions (1) and (2), to see whether the bargaining solution in fact improves welfare.
In the standard case where the policy-makers agree on the correct model, coordination must necessarily improve welfare for each country, or else its government would not have agreed to go along. In our case, coordination may improve welfare. For example if the true model is very close to that believed by the U.S. authorities, then the true iso-welfare map will be very similar to the perceived indifference curves shown in figure 1 , and U.S. welfare will indeed be higher at B than N. But this need not be the case.
The true optimum policy combination to maximize U.S. welfare is given by differentiating (1) with respect to in (as in the derivation of (7) but without the subscripts), and with respect to m*, and solving simultaneously:
If the true optimum point 0 is not at Ous but rather is as shown in Figure 2 , with the new set of true Iso-welfare curves drawn, then the move from N to B could very well be In the wrong direction, resulting in a reduction in U.S. welfare. Similarly If the true optimum policy combination from the viewpoint of European Interests is not at e but rather at P as shown In Figure 2 , then coordination could reduce European welfare as well.
It is worth considering momentarily the case when the two policy-makers are seeking to maximize the identical objective function, and disagree only about the proper model. For example they might be the monetary and fiscal authority within the same country. Our two propositions would still hold:
(1) the two policy-makers will in general be able to agree on a package of coordinated policy changes that each thinks will improve the (same) country's welfare relative to the Nash noncooperative solution, and (2) the package agreed to in bargaining could in fact worsen welfare as easily as Improve it. This is the case considered in Frankel (1986b) .9 While in that paper coordination arises solely from different perceptions, and in the conventional literature it arises solely from different objectives, in the present paper both factors are present. There is a surprising amount of disagreement, in particular, on whether a monetary expansion improves or worsens the current account and, in turn, on whether it is transmitted negatively or positively to the rest of the world. The reasons for this and other disagreements in the simulations are examined elsewhere.1° It suffices to repeat that disagreements with respect to both the sign and magnitude of effects are common among honorable economists, and are common even within subsets of models that are supposedly similar in orientation, let alone among policy-makers.
Computing the policy-makers' reactions requires knowing not only the perceived policy multipliers, but also the target optimums and the welfare weights. We adopt the same target values as Oudiz and Sachs (19814) : current accounts of zero for the United States and two percent of GNP for the non-U.S. OECD, and GNP gaps of zero for both regions.
The baseline values of both variables, specified as part of the Brookings simulation exercise, were below target as of 1985. Thus policy-makers will seek to Increase both output and the current account.
The targets, together with the baseline values for the variables and any set of policy multipliers from Table 1 , imply corresponding values for the constant terms A, B, G and H in equations (3)- (6).
The choice of welfare weights u and w is necessarily more
chose the values that the weights would have had to have held for implying a different Nash non-cooperative equilibrium. In Table 2 we report 6 x 6 = 36 of them.
(8 x 8 is a bit too unwieldly for one 
i(c)
.2. --s:
0. For each combination we report first whether the Nash equilibrium is stable, and the number of moves needed to reach convergence starting from the baseline.12 We then report the values of the two countries' variables of' interest in the equilibrium: the money supply (relative to the baseline), the perceived output and current account (relative to baseline, first, and then relative to the optimum) and the perceived welfare function (relative to the baseline). It usually turns out that both countries think they can do better than the baseline even without cooperating, but not always. All but two of' the 36 cases call for expansion by one country or the other.
Our main interest lies in the move from the non-cooperative to the bargaining equilibrium, shown in Table 3 . To take one example, if the U.S. policy-maker believes in the MCM model and the European policy-maker believes In the OECD model, then they can agree to expand further their money supplies simultaneously (0.36 percent and 1.59 percent, respectively). They each believe that this policy package will result in higher output with little adverse effect on their current accounts. This is the often-mentioned case in which the Nash equilibrium is too contractionary. But besides the case of simultaneous expansion Without knowing the true model, we can not determine whether any given policy package actually improves welfare. But we can get a good idea of the possibilities by trying out each of the models as a candidate for the true model. The 36 cells in Tables 14 and 5 correspond   to the same 36 combInations as Tables 2 and 3 . But within each cell we report the effect that the corresponding coordination package of Table 3 would have under each of the 6 models; thus there are 63 216 combinations altogether.13 Table 14 shows the actual effect of coordination on U.S. welfare and Table 5 The results thus suggest that the danger that coordination will worsen welfare rather than improve It Is more than just a pathological counterexample. It is true, but beside the point, that the proper strategy, if the correct model could be discovered, would be simply for both policy-makers to optimize subject to it. The point is that one cannot, under conditions where policy-makers do subscribe to different models, make the blanket pronouncement that coordination must Improve welfare. We again assume that each country seeks to minimize a quadratic loss function. Rather than repeating our earlier points in algebraic form, we turn directly to the simulation results. As before, the weights and target optimums are taken from Oudiz and Sachs (19811) .
The inflation target is zero for both the United States and Europe.
Thus policy-makers will seek to reduce inflation, as well as increase output and the current account. Table 7 reports the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium for the six models.15 The movement from the baseline to the Nash involves fiscal expansion as often as contraction. (Both fiscal authorities contract in 9 case, both expand in 9, and only one expands in 18.) But the money supply Is expanded more often (both central banks contract in 8 cases, both expand in 18 cases, and one expands in 10.) ('('('2 0. 00:1 Thus the odds for successful coordination appear to be no better when policy-makers can take advantage of the monetary-fiscal mix than when the degree of monetary ease is alone at stake. 
where it' is the row vector of itj and in is the column vector of in1. We have one version of equation (7') for each of the eight models in which the U.S. central bank might believe, giving (7") M + N(lr*fm*)
and similarly for Europe, where I is the identity matrix.
Equations (12)- (13) represent the 8x8 computable Nash non-cooperative solutions for the 8x8 combinations of models in which the two policy-makers could believe. As a concrete example we could try putting equal weight on each of our eight Brookings models: The second extension would view policy-makers as not so stubborn as to believe in their own models with certainty. Now they assign some probability to the possibility that each of the eight models may be true, and choose their policies so as to maximize expected welfare, as in Brainard (1967 that it would consequently set, and also taking into account the different possible true models and the consequent etfects on the macroeconomy. The interesting application of Bayesian principles comes in the realization that the two kinds of uncertainty are not independent.
The probability that a given action by the foreign central bank will have the consequences implied by model 2 is greater if that action is the one that would be optimally chosen based on the observation of the -25 -data set Z2, i.e., that data set that would imply model 2 as the maximum likelihood estimate.
These three extensions are more elaborate models of the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium, but none offers an evident reason for altering our conclusion that the bargaining solution is as likely to reduce welfare as to improve it. For those interested in making coordination work, it is natural to ask whether there might not be some other cooperative solution concept (that is, mapping from the players' beliefs and welfare functions to their policy settings) that would turn out to Improve welfare by light of the true model more often than does the Nash bargaining equilibrium in Tables 14 and 5. Under certain conditions, the weighted average of two statistical estimators will be a better estimator of a parameter than either considered alone. If the policy-makers' models are treated as different statistical estimators of the true model, it might be better to channel the bargaining process to focus on parameters rather than directly on policy settings, and then to set policy so as to maximize weifare gains relative to the Nash noncooperative equilibrium, then the first-order conditions turn out to be stated in terms of expected products of multipliers such as E(CH), the expectation (based on available data) of the product of the multiplier of U.S. money on U.S.
income and the multiplier of European money on U.S. income. If we were willing to think of each model's estimate of CII as being equal to the true CH plus an independent random error (which could be either of equal or different variances across models), then the best estimate of CII conditional on any two available models 1 and 2 would be a weighted average of their estimates e(CH)1 + (1-e)(CH)2 (with either equal or unequal weights, as appropriate). The coordinating agent would then calculate the value of in and m* that satisfied the first order conditions in terms of these averaged multiplier-products, and would instruct the two central banks to adopt those monetary policies, assuming they wish to avoid a breakdown to the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium. The extension of the present line of research would be to calculate the effects of such compromises by using, again, each of the eight models as possible true models, and to see if the result is an improvement in the countries' welfare levels any more often than when the conventional Nash bargaining solution Is used. If so, the prescriptive implication would be that policy-makers in OECD or G-7 meetings might better spend their time debating directly their views of the world, rather than debating only over the policies that they would like each other to adopt.
-27 -It is not a matter of deciding whether the treatment in the present paper is adequate. Extensions such as those sketched in this section need to be pursued. It is only a matter of sorting out which extensions are highest priority, a process In which we trust some of our readers will assist. Hamada (1976) is generally credited with the birth of the topic in its modern analytic form (though under the assumption of fixed exchange rates). More recent contributions Include Canzonerl and Gray (1983) . Miller and Salmon (1985) , Rogoff (1985) and Buiter and Marston (1985) . For good introductions to the literature and further references, see Oudiz and Sachs (19811) or Cooper (1985) .
FOOTNOTES

2
There are two important qualifications to the generality of the proposition that coordination improves welfare under the standard assumption that policy-makers know the true model. The first Is that if policy-makers have enough independent instruments to reach their optimum target goals regardless of each others' actions, then coordination is moot. The second is that Rogoff (1985) and Kehoe (1986) have shown that if coordination reduces governments' ability to precommit to anti-inflationary policies, credibly to their own peoples, then it can reduce welfare. The present paper is a counterexample along very different lines.
3
Oudlz and Sachs (198'!) and Ishli, McKibbin and Sachs (1985) .
The project was entitled "Empirical Macroeconomics for Interdependent Economic." Frankel (1986a) discusses the disagreements among the 12 models.
5
Indeed many of the authors in the coordination literature decline to take any position at all on whether the problem with the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium is that it is too contractionary or too expansionary, etc. They leave it for econometriclans to fill in the correct parameter values at some later date.
6
One's intuition is that players who disagree about the model will find it harder to agree on a package of joint policy changes. The correct way to interpret this intuition is probably that, even if there exists a bargaining solution that is believed Pareto-superior to the non-cooperative solution, It will be harder for the players to agree on a mechanism to enforce the bargaining solution if they do not share a common view of the world. In an Interesting account that he believes may carry lessons for macroeconomic coordination, Cooper (1986) describes the history of International cooperation in the sphere of public health; cooperation was first proposed early In the 19th century, but because there were conflicting schools of thought on whether diseases were carried internationally by travelers, actual cooperation did not take place until a consensus was achieved around 1900 as to the correct model of the transmission of disease. If there are positive costs to an enforcement mechanism and some parties believe the gains from coordination are small, then it will not take place.
This holds in the eight econometric models considered in the following section except the LIVPL and MSG models.
8
More often, It has been private economists, and the governments of smaller countries, who have urged such coordinated expansion; e.g., Bergsten, et al (1982) . The 1981-814 Reagan Administration opposed coordination.
9
In equations (3) and (14), one could simply redefine m* as fiscal policy, and let y y, x x, and . As long as the two policy-makers have different parameter estimates, there will still be scope for coordination. The only difference is that in Figure 2 the true optimal points P and 0 would coincide.
10 The positive effect of a monetary expansion on the current account via currency depreciation is offset by a negative effect via higher income. In the Mundell-Fleming model the positive effect on the current account must dominate, to match the net capital outflow that results from lower interest rates, giving negative transmission abroad. But in more modern models the net capital flow may be reversed, In response to perceived overshooting of the exchange rate. The theoretical literature contains many other ways of reversing the Mundell-Fleming transmission results as well. (See Mussa (1979) or, for an optimizing approach, Svensson and van Wijnbergen (1986) ). On the models used in the Brookings simulations, see Frankel (1986a) , or other papers In Bryant and Henderson.
11 The alternative weights tried were: first, equal weight on both targets and, second, a weight of 20 times greater on the current account than on GNP (for both countries). Different targets tried were: a GNP target 95% of the baseline level for the US, and a GNP target of 95% of the baseline level for Europe. For these experiments, the magnitude of the changes in targets and instruments was the same as in the example presented. The total count for true gains and losses for the two countries were:
Relative weight ü 12 There is only one case of technical instability, the combination of the MSG and VAR models. In this case the U.S. reaction function is steeper than the European reaction function because the transmission effects are strong relative to the own multiplier effects.
13 The diagonal entries of the three-dimensional matrix are the cases where both policy-makers have the correct model. The calculations correspond conceptually to those in Oudiz and Sachs (19811) for the MCM and EPA models.
111 The most bizarre combination occurs when the U.S. believes the LIVPL model and Europe believes the OECD model. Under this combination, the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium entails a mutually destructive increase in the European money supply of almost 100 percent and decrease in the U.S. money supply of over 100 percent C!) (Evidently the problem is that the Liverpool model shows European monetary expansion raising U.S. output much more than does U.S. monetary expansion, as can be seen in Table 1 .)
17 Table 8 shows that according to the MSG model this change in the monetary/fiscal mix, though increasing non-U.S. output 0.1 percent and having the desired effect on the current accounts, would in fact reduce U.S. output 0.7 percent. There are several other combinations in the table where this same change in mix results from coordination, all of them involving the LIVPL model; but none of them shows quite the expected effects on the target variables.
18 As in the case of coordination of monetary policy alone, there are a few cases of absurdly large changes, in particular the two combinations with the MSG and MCM models. The explanation, again, is that these changes offset absurdly large changes implied by the move from the baseline to the Nash equilibrium in Table 7. 19 Brainard assumed a continuous probability distribution for the parameters (rather than assigning discrete probabilities to 12 models, as suggested here). Roubini (1986) applies this assumption to international coordination.
